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POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS-QUALIFICATIONS FOR
EXCLUSION FROM THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT
Since the enactment in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Actl [hereinafter
referred to as the Act] as an amendment to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 2 the application of federal preemption of state jurisdiction3
over labor disputes has been vital to the development of a more uni-
form administration of labor problems. 4 Beyond the preemptive rights
which were actually conferred on the National Labor Relations Board
[hereinafter referred to as the Board] by the Act,5 the Supreme Court
has expanded the Board's power to preempt state jurisdiction to in-
dude the administration of those labor disputes which are merely
"arguably" within the purview of sections 7 and 8 of the Act.6 Never-
theless, even in disputes arising under sections 7 and 8, before the Board
'Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
(1964).
FAct of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449.
3See Labor Management Relations Act § ,o(e), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(e) (1964). Unless
otherwise provided for in the Act, by the use of the phrase "affecting commerce,"
Congress has given the Board power to preempt state labor laws which conflict with
the Act. By expressly wording this section of the Act to cover enterprises "affecting
commerce," Congress apparently manifested its intent that the Act be extended to the
full limit of its constitutional power to regulate commerce among the states. Ever
since the case of Wichard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the meaning of "affecting
commerce" has been continually expanding, so that today there are very few business
enterprises which can claim that they have no discernible effect upon commerce
between the states.
"See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
5See Labor-Management Relations Act § lo(e), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(e) (1964).
6See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959):
When an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the Act, the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to be averted.
Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
More recently, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Stewart have indicated
that the Court may reconsider this holding if the proper facts are again presented
before the Court. In their opinion "only labor activity determined to be actually,
rather than arguably protected under federal law should be immune from state
judicial control." International Longshore Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397
U.S. 195, 202 (1970). In any case, the arguably protected rule only applies to parties
over whom the Board has jurisdiction and even then it is subject to several excep-
tions. For example, if the state interest in regulating conduct arguably within § 7
and § 8 of the Act yet also deeply rooted in state laws is not overriden by "clearly
expressed congressional direction" the state may still assume jurisdiction. 359 U.S.
at 244, 247. See also Fulton v. Emerson Electric Co., 420 F.2d 527, 530 (sth Cir. 1969)
where the court held that the Board does not have jurisdiction over a dispute which
is arguably within § 7 and § 8 of the Act where the facts transcend the employer-
employee relationship.
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may determine if the conduct of the parties to a labor dispute is argu-
ably subject to its jurisdiction, it must establish jurisdiction over the
parties themselves; the Act was never intended to affect all parties
within the nation's labor force with uniformity.7 Instead, it has been
estimated that the Act affected barely fifty per cent of the nation's
work force.8 Accordingly, where the jurisdiction of the Board turns on
the status of the parties involved in the labor dispute, neither Congress
nor the Supreme Court has intimated that in the interests of uniform
application of the Act the jurisdictional rights of the Board may be
expanded to encompass parties who are merely arguably within the
purview of the Act. Therefore, with regard to parties seeking to be ex-
cluded from the Board's jurisdiction, the Board must find that the
party is not "actually" excluded 9 from the Act before it may rightfully
find that it has jurisdiction over him. In particular, employers which
are state "political subdivisions", and their employees, are expressly
excluded from the scope of the Act and thereby from the Board's juris-
diction by sections 2(2) and (2)3.
The term 'employer' ... shall not include ... any State or politi-
cal subdivision thereof .... 10
The term 'employee' . . shall not include any individual em-
ployed.., by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.'"
Consequently, labor disputes involving the employees of a state politi-
cal subdivision are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, and
such employees have recourse only to state remedies.
Likewise, an employer who is a political subdivision is excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Board and may welcome the opportunity to
seek the shelter of state labor laws. However, when an employer claim-
ing political subdivision status seeks to be excluded from the Board's
jurisdiction, he must bear the burden of proof in an administrative
proceeding before the Board to establish that he is "actually" a political
1See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964), ex-
cluding employers such as the United States government, wholly owned government
corporations, Federal Reserve banks, states and their political subdivisions, non-profit
hospitals, and interstate railroads subject to the Railway Labor Act.
'Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 556 (1951).
OCf. Creekmore v. Public Belt R.R. Comm'n, 134 F.2d 576, 577 (5 th Cir. 1943).
The federal courts can only exert jurisdiction over employers who actually are in-
cluded within the purview of the Fair Labor Standards Act, not those employers who
should have been included.
"Labor-Management Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
"Labor-Management Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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subdivision of a state.12 If the Board's subsequent determination as to
whether an employer is actually a political subdivision of a state is the
result of a purely factual investigation, its decision will be conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence.13 However, where the state has
already determined by statute or judicial proceeding that the party
seeking the exclusion is in fact a political subdivision of that state the
Board may not countermand the state law without raising a purely
legal, non-factual question, of whether state law definitions 4 of a
term which is otherwise undefined in the Act may be preempted. The
Act itself provides that unless state law conflicts with the purposes of
the Act the Board is not empowered to preempt state jurisdiction.5
But even though a state law may not be in direct conflict with any de-
finition of the term which is contained in the Act, it is solely within
the province of the reviewing federal court to decide if the application
of state law definitions would conflict with the purposes of the Act.'0
In NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County,
Tennessee,'7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the natural gas utility district of Hawkins Countys was a
'Cf. Sweetlake Land & Oil Co. v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. gi (1965) (exclusions of agricultural employees). The converse of
this statement is that in order for the Board to reject an employer's claim of exemp-
tion from the Board's jurisdiction, it must find that he "actually is not" excluded
from the Act. Therefore, it may not be implied that if an employer fails to meet the
burden of proof in order to be excluded that the Board thereby exercises jurisdiction
over him because he is arguably included within the purview of the Act. Conse-
quently, with respect to a political subdivision employer who claims to be excluded
from the Act the Board must find that he is actually rather than arguably not a
political subdivision.
"Labor-Management Relations Act § 1o(e), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(e) (1964): "The find-
ings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."
:"But see Amalgamated Ass'n S.E.R.M.C.E. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel.
Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 398 n.25 (1951). The Court explains that with respect to those areas
in which Congress particularly desired state regulation to be operative, as opposed to
being preempted, Congress specifically mentions an employer who is a "State or
political subdivision thereof." Admittedly, however, neither the Court nor Congress
defines what is meant by this phrase.
"See Labor-Management Relations Act § 1o(e), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(e) (1964).
"8Note 46 infra.
17427 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1970).
''The natural gas utility district of Hawkins County, Tennessee is one of nearly
270 utility districts in the state. Brief for Appellant at 2. The only precedent dealing
with a Tennessee utility district prior to the Hawkins County case was rendered by
the Regional Director of the Board in West Tenn. Pub. Util. Dist. of Weakley,
Carroll, and Benton Counties, Tenn., No. 26-RC-2 9 72 (1967). There on precisely the
same facts as Hawkins County the Regional Director ruled that a utility district
created under Tennessee law [TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-26o6 et seq. (Supp. 1970)] was a
political subdivision. Therefore, it was held that the West Tennessee utility district
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political subdivision of Tennessee. Consquently, the court denied en-
forcement of a Board bargaining order which had been issued against
the utility district for refusing to bargain with a certified union of
pipe fitters. Utility districts under Tennessee law are "municipalities"'19
created to conduct, operate and maintain systems to furnish their com-
munities with water, sewage disposal, natural gas20 and other propriet-
ary services.21 However, the Board had determined that despite the
municipal nature22 of the Hawkins County utility district, it could not
be excluded from the Board's jurisdiction as a political subdivision be-
cause it did not qualify under the Board's test: a political subdivision
must have been "directly created by the state" or "administered by
was exempt from the Board's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Regional Director's
findings in that case are not binding on the Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County.
UrfTENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2607 (Supp. 1970). A district incorporated under this
provision is designated a "municipality."
"See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2608 (Supp. 197o).
mSee City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 12o F.2d 866 (4 th Cir. 1941).
A city [municipality] has two classes of powers,-the one legislative,
public, governmental, in the exercise of which it is a sovereignty
and governs the people; the other prdprietary, quasi private, con-
ferred upon it, not for the purpose of governing its people, but for
the private advantage of the inhabitants of the city and of the city
itself as a legal personality.
Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
Here the court held that in the exercise of proprietary functions, municipalities
should be governed by the same rules that govern a private corporation. However,
had Congress intended to differentiate the exclusions of political subdivisions on the
basis of whether they performed governmental or proprietary functions it could
easily have done so. See, e.g., Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 418(b) (5) (1964)
(the term 'coverage group' means employees of a political subdivision other than
those engaged in proprietary functions). Furthermore the federal courts have held
that where "political subdivision of a state" is used in federal statutes it is of no
consequence to one's claim to such status that the functions performed by the
political subdivision are proprietary rather than governmental. See Abad v. Puerto
Rico Commun. Auth., 88 F .Supp. 34, 41 (D.P.R. 1950).
2Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 167 N.L.R.B. 691 (1967). The
natural gas utility district was organized as a municipality [see TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 6-26o7 (Supp. 1970)] by petition of local property owners [see TENN. CoDE ANN.
§ 6-2602 (Supp. 1970)] with the approval of the county judge or chairman of the
county court [see TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2604 (Supp. 1970)] who is the highest elected
elected official in the county. Brief for Appellant at 15. The utility district enjoyed
preferred powers of eminent domain [see TENN. CODE ANN. §6-2611 (1955)] and the
right of exemption from state regulation [see TENN. CODE ANN. §6-2613 (1955)]-
Further, §6-2612 of the Utility District Act vests in the district "all the powers neces-
sary and requisite ... capable of being delegated by the legislature." TENN. CODE
ANN. §6-2612 (1955). The commissioners of the district had the power to subpoena
witnesses and to administer oaths; the income from its bonds was determined by
the Internal Revenue Service to be exempt from federal taxation under the exclusion
for municipals (see 427 F.2d at 314); and for purposes of the Social Security Act, it
was considered a political subdivision. See Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. §
418(b) (2) (1964); Brief for Appellant at 21.
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state appointed or publicly elected officials." 23 However, the Tennessee
Supreme Court had already determined that state utility districts such
as Hawkins County were "arms or instrumentalities" of Tennessee.2 4
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit, following the prior determination of the
Tennessee Supreme Court,25 held that the Board had no jurisdiction
over the Hawkins County utility district on the grounds that a state has
the right to create its own political subdivisions, and when its creations
have been held by the state's highest court to constitute arms or in-
strumentalities of the state such a holding ought to be binding on fed-
eral administrative agencies. 26
The Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County took cognizance of the fact
that the Fourth Circuit had upheld the Board's test for finding juris-
diction over a political subdivision in the case of NLRB v. Randolph
Electric Membership Corp.2 7 That decision was based on the belief that
in defining a political subdivision of a state, the federal courts should
defer to the Board's expertise in discerning "economic realities" from
state statutory characterization. 28 The Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County
carefully distinguished the Randolph case on the facts. 29 Nevertheless,
the dissent in Hawkins County relied entirely on the Randolph case
and would have granted the Board jurisdiction to enforce the bargain-
ing order against the utility district, despite the fact that the Tennessee
Supreme Court had characterized the district as an arm or instrumen-
tality of the state.30
Despite factual differences, however, there is an irreconcilable legal
conflict between Hawkins County and Randolph as to whether, for
purposes of Board jurisdiction, agency's determination or state law
'Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 692 (1967).
'See First Suburb. Water Util. Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 146 S.W.2d
948 (1941).
2id.
0-4 2 7 F.2d at 315.
'343 F.2d 6o (4th Cir. 1965).
"OId. at 62.
0427 F.2d at 313-14. In Randolph, there was no holding by the North Carolina
Supreme Court that electric membership corporations were political subdivisions of
the state, although by statute such corporations were entitled to the same rights as
any other political subdivision of the state [see GEN. STAT. OF N.C., § 117-19 (1964)
as amended, GEN. STAT. OF N.C., § 117-19 (Supp. 1969)] and several successive State
Attorneys General had so ruled. NLRB v. Randolph Electric Membership Corp., 343
F.2d 60, 62 (4 th Cir. 1965). The Hawkins County District offered its services to the
community without the restriction of membership in the corporation as in Randolph.
In Randolph the state did not confer on the district the power of eminent domain
and its status as a political subdivision for tax purposes was somewhat unsettled.
Note 22 supra.
'*427 F.2d at 315.
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should govern the status of an employer. Basic to the holding of the
Fourth Circuit in Randolph is an implicit conviction that, since the
Board has broad discretionary powers which are designed to enable it
to administer the Act uniformly across the United States,3 ' the Board's
test32 legitimately establishes uniform national standards for determin-
ing the jurisdictional status of allegedly exempt political subdivisions. 33
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County, disregarding
the discretionary powers of the Board could find no reasonable basis
under the Act for holding that state law definitions of a political sub-
division would interfere with the purposes of the Act.3 4
Prior to Randolph, the Board had never considered it necessary for
the purposes of the Act to set out any jurisdictional guidelines as to the
requirements for qualification as a political subdivision.3 In fact,
rather than insisting on the necessity for a uniform definition, the
Board explicitly held in New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard
and Nantucket Steamship Authority36 that since political subdivisions
were creatures of state law, state law definitions should determine the
Board's jurisdiction.37 The holding in New Bedford seems to contradict
the general rule with respect to federal jurisdiction, that federal acts
are applied without regard to state law;38 however, the Board based its
3'The fact that the Taft-Hartley Act statistically affected barely fifty per cent of
the nation's working force [see Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. Rav. 556 (1951)] was apparently of no consequence
to the Fourth Circuit in holding for uniform application. Heretofore uniform ap-
plication was only considered a legitimate practice with regard to conduct between
parties who were actually within the jurisdiction of the Act. See San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). At least it does not deter the Fourth
Circuit from insisting that the Board's test does promote the presumed Congressional
intent that the Act in all circumstances be applied uniformly. Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit may find support for this belief in the statement of policy contained
in section one of the Act which implies that national interest is served by the en-
couragement of collective bargaining insofar as it insures the free flow of commerce
among the states.
1Text accompanying note 23 supra.
'343 F.2d at 63.
"'427 F.2d at 314.
1See generally New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 2-RC-224 5 , April 16, 1954, reported
unofficially at 33 L.R.R.M. 1528 (created by the Legislature and governed by mem-
bers appointed by the Governor); In re Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941)
(district formed by petition of voters and governed by elected members of district);
Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 8 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1938) (port authority directly created by the
state legislation).
3127 N.L.R.B. 1322 (196o).
wId. at 1324.
*See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (interpreting the word
"felony" as it is used in a federal statute). But cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (if a right which is protected by state law is in no way
regulated by federal law, the state is free to regulate its own creations).
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decision on a controversial 0 United States Supreme Court exception
to this rule. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,40 which
involved an analogous question as to whether state or federal law
should determine the definition of an undefined federal statutory
term4 ' the Court held that, inasmuch as the definition of the term
"real property" was rooted in state common law, the words "real pro-
perty" in a federal statute would be defined according to forum state
law and not according to federal prescriptions.42 There would seem to
"See New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket S.S. Auth.,
127 N.L.R.B. 1322 (ig6o). The Board based its decision on the holding in Recon-
struction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946). The Fourth Circuit
contended that Beaver County interpreted a law which Congress did not intend to
operate with national uniformity. Therefore, because Congress sought uniform solu-
tions to national labor disputes in enacting the Act, the Board in New Bedford was
in error in applying the holding but not the ratio decidendi of Beaver County.
Possibly due to the fact that the Act was never intended to affect the nation's work-
ing force uniformly, the Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County rejected this reasoning. It
appears the Fourth Circuit's reasoning was rejected because, although a uniform
effect was not anticipated by the law which was interpreted in Beaver County, there
was no indication that the means of achieving that diverse effect were not to be uni-
formly applied. In any case, the Sixth Circuit held that the Board did not err in
New Bedford in applying Beaver County to a dispute arising under the Act.
"0328 U.S. 204 (1946).
"Id. at 21o. See also Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); Board of County
Comm'rs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939). In De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580 (1956), the Court applied state law to define "children" although the issue
arose in connection with the right to renew a copyright-a peculiarly federal subject.
The Court held that, especially in regard to relationships which are primarily a
matter of state concern, the federal courts in applying federal law must refer to the
law of the state which created -the legal relationship referred to without definition
in a federal statute. The validity of this holding has not been jeopardized by the
Court's subsequent decision in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Co., 391
U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). In Glona the Court found that the word "child" could not be
defined by state law in a diversity action because there was no rationale for a state
law which was contrary to a biological relationship. Furthermore, the holding in
De Sylva is evidence of a Supreme Court policy that originated in 1916 with the case
of Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Kenny, 240 U.S. 489 (1916) which arose under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. Here the Court relied on North Carolina law to
determine the meaning of "next of kin" in the statute. Moreover the Court held in
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966), that even in light of Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (95o), the De Sylva rule was still applicable. In Wissner Cali-
fornia sought to apply its community property rule in derogation of the federal
statutory policy that soldiers have an absolute right to name a beneficiary of their
National Service Life Insurance, but the Court held that the California rule would
directly have undercut congressional intent.
2Reconstruction Finance Co. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). Cf. San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (Inasmuch as the
unlawful activity of the parties to the labor dispute is provided a remedy which is
deeply rooted in state law, the state may not automatically be denied jurisdiction
simply because the activity of the parties is also "arguably" within §§ 7 & 8 of the
Act).
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be no legal relationship which is more uniquely rooted in state law than
the determination of what shall be a state political subdivision.
Yet in the interest of uniformity, and even at the expense of pre-
empting state law, the Board has insisted in both Randolph
43 (suc-
cessfully) and Hawkins County44 (unsuccessfully) that its "directly
created by the state" test for granting an employer an exclusion as a
state political subdivision is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
Nevertheless, the Board's statutory interpretation is not subject to the
deference which the reviewing federal courts give to a finding of fact by
the Board.45 Despite the privilege of the reviewing federal courts to
disregard 46 a novel statutory interpretation 47 which the Board has pro-
jected, they are not so privileged as to completely disregard other re-
liable sources such as the decisions of the federal courts, the intent of
Congress and the words of the statute.
48
Because neither the language49 nor the legislative history ° of the
Act discloses a definition of "political subdivision," the Board is ad-
mittedly faced with the problem of defining the term. Accordingly, in
deference to the supposed Congressional desire for a uniform applica-
'3343 F.2d at 62.
'"427 F.2d at 313.
"Notes 13 supra and 46 infra. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act's
grant of authority to the Board with respect to finding facts or applying facts to
settled law to mean that if the Board's finding rests on a choice between "two fairly
conflicting views" the reviewing federal court may not reverse simply because as an
original matter it might have decided the question differently. See NLRB v. United
Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 488 (1951). However, a similar standard for a federal agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute has been applied. See Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1
(1968). In this case the Supreme Court allowed the federal agency's interpretation
of the undefined statutory term "'area" to stand because the agency's interpretation
was reasonable in light of the permissible alternatives for defining the term. The
case is distinguishable from Hawkins County because the agency's interpretation in
no way attempted to preempt a state law. Consequently, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court's decision only applies to fact situations where there is no law of any
source whatever to define a statutory term, in which cases the federal agency may
act within the bounds of reason.
'*See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 482 (1951) quoting from
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1ioo(e) (1964): "So far as necessary to
decision and where presented, the reviewing [federal] court shall decide all relevant
questions of law."
"2This interpretation is novel so far as the Sixth Circuit is concerned for as
recently as 1967 it had been held that utility districts of Tennessee were political
subdivisions. Note 18 supra. Yet even in the absence of this holding of the Regional
Director it has not been held that the decision of the Fourth Circuit is entitled to
any more weight than the decision of one state supreme court on another.
'Notes 49-1o3 and accompanying text infra.
"See Labor-Management Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
rSee H.R. REP. No. 245, Soth Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
1971]
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tion of the Act,51 the Fourth Circuit based its decision on dicta from
the pre-Taft-Hartley holding in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.
5 2
that the Board may define the term employer according to the dictates
of the "economic realities" of the situation regardless of how state or
common law may characterize such employers.5 3 Specifically, Hearst
involved a determination by the Court as to the meaning of the term
"employee," and the holding of that case has subsequently been over-
ruled by Congress.5 4 Nevertheless, the dicta in Hearst that the Board
was empowered even in the absence of specific statutory authority to dis-
regard state law definitions of "employer" and "employee" if they con-
G1Note 31 supra.
52322 U.S. i1 (1944).
63Id. at 122-23. The Supreme Court declared in Hearst that so long as the
Board's interpretation of a statute has a "reasonable basis in law," the reviewing
federal courts should uphold its decisions. Id. at 131. However, since the Taft-Hartley
Act the Supreme Court has not reiterated this standard. Instead, it has only been
held that a "reasonable" interpretation of the facts will be conclusive. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 390 U.S. 254, 26o (1968) (extended their holding to the application of facts
to settled law). It has not been held that the federal courts must resign themselves
to a merely reasonable interpretation of the law rather than dedicating themselves
to the correct interpretation of the law. However, the Fourth Circuit in Randolph
relies on the standard of review in Hearst rather than subsequent standards which
were proposed by the Court in Universal Camera. The invalidity of the "reasonable
basis in law" standard is evident upon consideration of the following quotations
from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Universal Camera:
We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts must now assume more re-
sponsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board de-
cisions than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts
must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the
conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them the
responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable
grounds. That responsibility is not less real because it is limited
to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear substantial ....
340 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
It would be mischievous word-playing to find that the scope of re-
view under the Taft-Hartley Act is any different from that under
the Administrative Procedure Act
Id. at 487.
So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of any agency action. Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1010(e) (1964).
Id. at 481.
"See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 n.io (1964); H.R .REP. No. 245,
8oth Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1947); 1 LEG. HisT. OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RE.ATONS
ACT 309 (1947).
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flicted with the purposes of the Act or with "economic realities" has
not been specifically contradicted. But Congress' adverse reaction 55 to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in the Hearst case 6 is
dearly manifested by the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments to the definitions of "employer" and "employee":
It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, au-
thorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever
meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended.., that
the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary
meanings.5t
Subsequent to the amendments to section 2(2), ordinary meaning, in
the absence of statutory definition, has meant ordinary common law
meaning. For example, the courts have interpreted the undefined
word "agency" as it is found in section 2(2) 58 solely according to its
common law meaning,59 without regard to the Board's expertise in
"economic realities." Implicit, therefore, in the judicial application of
the common law meaning of undefined terms is a conviction of the
c'NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (x968).
r4The Supreme Court's decision in Hearst was amplified by the following dicta
from Justice Rutledge's opinion:
Nothing in the statute's background, history, terms or purposes
indicates its [the definition of employer] scope is to be limited by
such varying local conceptions, either statutory or judicial, or that
it is to be administered in accordance with whatever different stand-
ards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the disposition of
unrelated, local problems.
322 U.S. at 123.
rrH.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 18 (1947) (emphasis added). Congress
also explained that in Hearst:
[T]he Board expanded the definition of the term "employee"
beyond anything that it ever had included before, and the Supreme
Court, relying upon the theoretic "expertness" of the Board, up-
held the Board .... It must be presumed that when Congress passed
the Labor Act, it intended words it used to have the meanings
that they had when Congress passed the act, not new meanings
that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might think up. * * * To
correct what the Board has done, and what the Supreme Court,
putting misplaced reliance upon the board's expertness, has ap-
proved, the bill excludes "independent contractors" from the de-
finition of "employee."
Id. at 8.
w'The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly.... Labor-Management Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1964).
5See Lummus Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Note, Labor
Law-Outsiders' as Agents of Employer, 45 N.C.L. REP. 778 (1967). See also NLRB
v. Howard Johnson Co., 317 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1963) (determining if restaurant chain
was an agent of a political subdivision); H.R. REi'. No. 245, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. ii,
68 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 31, 36 (1954).
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federal courts that unless the Act specifically changes the common law,
such meanings are still applicable. Consequently, in the analogous
problem of defining the undefined term "political subdivision" there
is no compelling reason for not applying the term "political subdivi-
sion" in accordance with its ordinary and common law meaning.
At first glance, however, there is no "ordinary" definition of the
term "political subdivision", for some states have expressly defined the
term in their statutes6o while other states have been content to leave
such determinations to state judicial discretion. 61 Moreover, even in
a single state a governmental unit may be considered a political sub-
division for one purpose but not for another.62 So, heretofore, in the
absence of any federal law to the contrary, the ordinary and common
law meaning of a state political subdivision has depended upon state
legislation and court decisions. In view of these facts the Hawkins
County case, as opposed to Randolph, is in accord with the implied
congressional intent that the common law meaning of this term is still
applicable.
However, despite the fact that there is no federal common law,6 3
perhaps the "ordinary" meaning to which Congress refers is the ordi-
nary interpretation of the term "political subdivision" as it is found
in other federal statutes.64 In this regard, the acknowledged federal
*'See, e.g., ARiz. CoNsT. art. 13, § 7 (1956); MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
§§ 2.26, 2.27, 2.29 at 477-87 (3d ed. 1949).
6'E.g., State v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362, 365 (1902), quoting State ex rel.
Lydecker v. Englewood Tp., 42 N.J.L. 154, 157 (Sup. Ct. 1879):
[T]hey [political subdivisions] embrace a certain territory and its
inhabitants, organized for the public advantage and not in the
interest of particular individuals or classes; that their chief design
is the exercise of governmental functions; and that to the electors
residing within each is to some extent committed the power of
local government, to be wielded either mediately or immediately
within their territory for the peculiar benefit of the people there
residing.
2See Saint Ferdinand Sewer Dist. v. Turner, 356 Mo. 804, 203 S.W.2d 731,
732-33 (1947) (sewer district which was a political subdivision within Mo. CONsT.
art. io, § 15 was not a political subdivision within Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 3). Compare
MICH. STAT. ANN., § 5.2770(5) (1969) (political subdivision is "any ... local unit of
this state') with MicH. STAT. ANN. § 5.5000(2) (1969) (political subdivision includes
"entities, whether organized and existing under charter or general law.")
63See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (k) (1964) (defines state
political subdivision as "any... irrigation or other district, municipality, or other
governmental organization" without regard for any procedural criteria for forma-
tion or operation of such governmental units). In both the INERNaL REVENUE CODE
of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1964), and 'the Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. §§
410(k)(4)(c), 418(b)(2) (1964), "[t]he term 'political subdivision' includes an instrn-
mentality of.,. a State." This may be significant since the Sixth Circuit excluded
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dependence upon state law definitions 5 indicates that there is no dis-
cernible difference between the federal interpretation of state political
subdivision and the common law meaning of the term. Support for
this conclusion is evident from the federal courts' treatment of the
phrase "political subdivisions of any state" as it appeared in the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act prior to 1940.66 For example, a federal district
court in California in applying this statutory phrase found that an
irrigation district was a "state political subdivision", despite the ab-
sence of state law to support its conclusion. The district was organized
for public functions; it was created by the state; its officers were pub-
licly elected; and it had the powers of taxation and eminent domain. 7
However, in a similar fact situation in Florida, the federal district court
distinguished the California case, and held that where the state law had
specifically addressed the problem of what constituted a "political sub-
division" for that state, such determinations were binding on the
federal courts, despite the unrestricted power of Congress to establish
uniform bankruptcy laws.68
Another federal statute in which state political subdivisions are
given special treatment as employers is the Social Security Act.6 9 This
fact may be considered significant to the federal courts' interpretation of
the term "political subdivision" in the Act in view of the Supreme Court
holding that the statutory treatment of the employer-employee relation-
ship in the National Labor Relations and Social Security Acts are ana-
logous.7° Where, for example, a public transportation corporation
sought exclusion from the Social Security Act7 ' as a "political subdivi-
sion" of Massachusetts, the federal district court disallowed the claim
on the basis that the state did not have requisite control over the cor-
the Hawkins County district on the grounds that it was an "instrumentality" of
Tennessee.
6See, e.g., Roberts v. Board of Pub. Instr., 112 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1940). In de-
termining what constitutes a political subdivision under the Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act the court relies on the fact that "Mhe Florida statutes do not so pro-
vide, the decisions do not so hold." Id. at 461.
01Act of July 1, 1898 C. 541, § 401-04, 3o Stat. 544.
0
7in re Lindsay-Strathmore Inr. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 129, 133-34 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
O1n re Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 23 F. Supp. 229, 234 (S.D. Fla. 1938).
6Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. §§ 41o(k)(4)(c), § 4 18(b)(2) (1964).
7OSee Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947). See also
S.S.T. 159, 1937-1 Cui. BULt. 430. A water improvement district organized under
the statutes of Texas is a subdivision of the state; therefore it was held to be
exempt from the Social Security Act. The Texas statute provides for the establish-
ment of such districts upon petition of the majority of landowners situated within
the proposed district, for the purpose of providing irrigation for the land included
in the district, and for furnishing water for private and commercial purposes.
7LAct of Aug. io, 1939, ch. 666, § 9o5(b), 53 Stat. 1400 (now INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 3121).
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poration to justify considering it as a political subdivision. 72 It was
alleged that the state was subsidizing the private transportation cor-
poration in return for the right to appoint the board of directors. Yet,
despite factual differences, this holding may be interpreted by the
Board as precedent for its test requiring some element of direct state
control in either the creation or administration of a "political subdivi-
sion." But significantly, the controlling state statute did not provide
that simply because the Governor appointed the board of directors of
a subsidized private corporation it was transformed into a "political
subdivision."7 3 Furthermore, it was not alleged that the federal court's
holding that the transportation corporation was not a political sub-
division conflicted with any state court decision.
The importance of the Board's requirement of state control over a
political subdivision as a prerequisite to establishing an employer's
status has not been the crucial issue where other federal courts have
considered the scope of the term "political subdivision." The emphasis
has been on the broad and comprehensive connotations of the term,
74
rather than on any narrow prerequisites for creating and operating a
political subdivision. Accordingly, distinctions between political sub-
divisions which engage in proprietary as opposed to governmental func-
tions, have been rejected as a means to discredit the legitimacy of an
employer's status as a political subdivision,7 5 unless the federal statute
provides for such restrictions.7 6 In addition, the federal courts have
held that so long as the services which are rendered by the political sub-
division are of a type which is by custom provided by the state
77 it is
72See Boston Elevated Ry. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 8o9, 811 (W.D. Mass. 1939);
Compare Amalgamated Ass'n S.E.R.M.C.E. v. Missouri, 374 U.S: 74, 81 (1963) with
United States v. United Mine Workers of America 330 U.S. 258, 289 (1947). Neither
case pre-empted an established state statutory or judicial definition.
"Boston Elevated Ry. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 809, 81o (W.D. Mass. 1939).
74See Abad v. Puerto Rico Commun. Auth., 88 F. Supp. 34 (D. P. R. 1950). "The
term 'political subdivision (sic) within the meaning of the exemption denotes any
division of the State or territory which is a municipal corporation . . ." Id. at 40.
The Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945), had previously cited the following quotation
from 30 OP. ATY. GEN. 252 (1914):
[r]he term 'political subdivision' is broad and comprehensive and
denotes any division of the State made by the proper authorities
thereof, acting within their constitutional powers, for the purpose
of carrying out a portion of those functions of the State ... re-
garded as public.
144 F.2d at 0OO4. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. White's Estate, 144
F.2d o 9ig (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
raSee Abad v. Puerto Rico Commun. Auth., 88 F. Supp. 34, 41 (D.P.R. 195o).
7
6E.g., Social Security Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 4 8(b)( 5) (Supp. 1965).
71See Abad v. Puerto Rico Commun. Auth. 88 F. Supp. 34, 41-42 (D.P.R. 1950).
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irrelevant that private corporations might just as easily have provided
these services.
Nowhere in Randolph or Hawkins County did the court intimate
that the services of the "political subdivision" were not customarily
provided by state political subdivisions, 78 although the dissent in
Hawkins County suggested that the distribution of natural gas is not
"necessarily" a governmental function.7 9 Nevertheless, the Board in-
sisted in both Randolphs o and Hawkins Countys ' that the economic
similarities between the "political subdivision" and private corpora-
tions providing the same types of services were sufficient cause to deny
the request that the political subdivision be excluded from the Board's
jurisdiction.
Consequently, in view of Reconstruction Finance Corp.,8 2 the intent
of Congress as revealed in the legislative history,83 and the decisions of
the Federal courts, 8 4 there appears to be ample precedent for hold-
ing that state law is operative for defining a state political subdivision
in a federal statute. Yet it does not follow that the Sixth Circuit neces-
sarily had to go beyond the words of the exclusion clause itself in order
to reach the desired result that state law determinations should be
binding on the Board. Since the specific group of employers which is
excluded from the intended scope of the Act is described as "any State
or political subdivision thereof," the meaning of the words "state
political subdivision" may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of the words associated with them.s 5 Accordingly, the words "political
subdivision" are given particular reference to "any state," by the word
"thereof," the effect being that the clause may be interpreted to read
"any political subdivision of any state."8 6 To the contrary, without the
word "thereof" to qualify the words "any political subdivision" in terms
"See NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 6o (4th Cir. 1965).
The Fourth Circuit based its holding on the ground that
their [electric membership corporations'] relation to the state and
their actual methods of operation do not fit the label [political sub-
division] given them,
rather than on the belief that natural gas is not customarily provided for by the
state. Id. at 64.
'427 F.2d at Ps6 (dissenting opinion).
rOSee 343 F.2d at 62.
6116 7 N.L.R.B. at 691-92.
2Notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
8Text accompanying notes 57-59 supra and note 85 infra.
"4Notes 64-77 supra.
6H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAwS 194 (2d ed. 191 ).
"The most common meaning of the word "thereof" is "of it." See VEBsTER's
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2372 (3d ed. 1961). The "it" to which "thereof"
relers in this case is "any state"; hence any political subdivision of any state.
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of "any state," it would be legitimate to attempt to formulate some uni-
form reference with which to associate any political subdivision. But
by the use of the word "of" (as derived from "thereof"), Congress may
have meant not only to indicate that the political subdivisions in ques-
tion were physically attached to "any state" but also that any state may
be the maker of any political subdivision.87 Therefore, in light of the
fact that there is no uniform procedure for making a state political
subdivision,8 8 it is significant that the exclusion is for any political
subdivision of (made by) any state. Indeed, in this context the word
"any" is an adjective describing "one (state-made political subdivision)
out of a number, as one (state-made political subdivision) selected with-
out restriction or limitation of choice"8 9 implying that, without excep-
tion, all employers who are state-made political subdivisions are ex-
cluded from the Act. Under this interpretation of the statutory langu-
age, to refuse the exemption to only one particular state-made political
subdivision would be to frustrate the apparent intention of the drafters.
Furthermore, since political subdivisions may be created by the
state directly or indirectly through either the legislative or judicial
process,90 it may be concluded that insistence by the Board that all poli-
tical subdivisions be created in conformity with uniform board prere-
quisites would neither be in accord with the common law meaning of
8'Compare the exclusion of "any State or political subdivision thereof" with
the exclusion for "the United States or any wholly owned government corporation"
which is also found in § 152(2) of the Act. In the original House version of the
Taft-Hartley Act the latter exclusion was for "the United States or any instru-
mentality thereof." H.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 18 (1947). By changing
the exclusion to "any wholly owned government corporation," it may be assumed
that Congress intended thereby to narrow the broad connotations of the phrase
"any instrumentality thereof" with reference to "the United States." Having so
recognized the broad connotations of the "instrumentality thereof" phrase in one
instance it seems inconceivable that Congress did not appreciate the broad connota-
tions of the phrase "any political subdivision thereof" with reference to "any state."
Tbhis is especially significant in view of the fact that the Sixth Circuit has not
distinguished an "instrumentality" of a state from a "political subdivision" of a
state. Consequently, an attempt by the Board to narrow the scope of the exclusion
borders on judicial legislation.
88WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1565 (3d ed. 1961). The use of the
word "of" is described as follows:
7- [U]sed as a function word to indicate the agent or doer of an act
or action ... (3) after a noun indicating the maker or doer often
with the force of a subjective genitive (plays [o] Shakespeare), (the
mercy [of] -the Lord), (the ruins [of] time). (emphasis added).
"'Notes 6o-62 and accompanying text supra.
WEBSrEar's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 126 (2d ed. 1952). See generally
International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 (5 th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 556 (1951). This case relates the word "any" in § 2(2) of the Act
to other provisions which describe statutory terms by using "any."
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the term "state political subdivision" nor the implied meaning of the ex-
clusion clause itself. Accordingly it may be argued that the Board is
merely determining what it considers to be desirable policy rather
than what the statute actually says.91 It has been held that it is not the
duty of the Board to determine which employers should be within the
purview of the Act but rather which employers are within its legal jur-
isdiction.9 2 Determining which employers should be included in the
Act is a unique responsibility of the legislature, not of the federal
courts or the Board.93
Prior to the Randolph case, therefore, the grounds upon which the
Board sought to discredit the "state political subdivision" status of
both the Randolph Elecrtic Membership Corporation and the Hawkins
County Natural Gas Utility District had no reasonable bases in law,
apart from the uncertain limits of administrative discretion which
had been given to the Board by the Hearst case.94 Otherwise, the
Board's prerequisites of direct state creation or administration of state
political subdivisions had only been useful where the federal court
sought to include95 within a federal definition of a "state political sub-
division" employers who were not so defined by state law. Never have
these prerequisites or any other uniform federal criteria been used to
exclude an employer who was already protected by state definitions
as a "political subdivision" of that state. However, the holding in the
Hearst case which provided precedent for the Board's reliance on
"economic realities" and disregard for state law definitions of em-
ployers is of questionable validity, since both Congress and the Su-
preme Court97 now consider Hearst to be overruled. Consequently,
the holding of earlier federal cases which discounted the significance of
similarities of political subdivisions and private corporations9 s may
still be applicable.
"Notes 62-63 supra.
t'See Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 363 (1949); Local 833,
U.A.W., 116 N.L.R.B. 267, 272 (1956).
"3Cf. Creekmore v. Public Belt R.R. Comm., 134 F.2d 576, 577 (5th Cir. 1943);
H.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 11 (1947). Here the House report explains
that heretofore the Board has not applied the Act to any of the many instrumentali-
ties of the United States "but whether or not it should do so, Congress, not the
Board should decide." Likewise it may be argued that in view of this intent with
regard to instrumentalities of the United States, Congress did not intend for the
Board to take jurisdiction over employers who "actually are" state-made political
subdivisions.
"4Cf. Creekmore v. Public Belt R.R. Comm., 134 F.2d 576, 577 (5th Cir. 1943).
"Note 56 supra.
"'Note 67 and accompanying text supra.
"'Note 54 supra.
"lSee Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 nao (1964).
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But the Sixth Circuit in Hawkins County, rather than discredit the
"economic realities" test of Randolph and Hearst as an invalid means
for determining the status of a state political subdivision, tried
to avoid on the facts the implications that the test might have had if
applied to the natural gas utility district.99 It is, however, at least argu-
able that there are significant economic similarities between the utility
district and private corporations. 100 Consequently, the court in Haw-
kins County could not reverse the Board on this factual issue simply
because it might have decided the case differently as an original mat-
ter.10' Instead, it reversed on the ground that, contrary to the holding
in Randolph and Hearst, the Board has no basis in law for ignoring a
state supreme court's definitions of a political subdivision of that state
in order to preempt state jurisdiction over its political subdivisions.
02
Despite the law prior to 1947, the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act indicates that Congress did not intend for the Board to
give to terms in the Act "whatever meaning it wished." Therefore, in
accord with the holding of Hawkins County and the common law of the
states, which heretofore has constituted the "ordinary" meaning of the
term, it appears that "state political subdivisions" are too deeply rooted
in the laws of the individual states to have any meaning apart from
state law definitions, whether legislative or judicial. Indeed, perhaps it
was an awareness of this fact that caused Congress to precede the ex-
clusion of "State or political subdivision" with the indiscriminate ar-
ticle "any" and to follow it with the determinative word "thereof"
which may refer to any political subdivision which has been "made by"
any state. Consequently, unless the Supreme Court should revive the
thinking in the Hearst case, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hawkins
County appears to be consistent with the statutory language, the intent
of Congress, and the other decisions of the federal courts.
ROBERT RANDOLPH HATFEN
"Notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
u"Note 29 supra. But if Hearst is still applicable it would be of no consequence
that the Randolph Membership Corporation relied merely on a statute while
the Hawkins County district relied on a state court decision, for the Hearst
case discounted both state legislative and judicial definitions. 322 U.S. at 123.
10 The power of eminent domain has been delegated to private and public
utilities. See generally Cline v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 260 F.2d 271, 273 (ioth Cir.
1958); Thatcher v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 18o F.2d 644, 647 (5 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 829 (1950); North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. v. Southern Power
Co., 282 F. 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1922), cert. dismissed, 263 U.S. 508 (1924). Legislative
grants of tax exemption are frequently made to private utilities. See generally Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 215 F.2d 542, 546-547 (4th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 591 (1955); Bush v. Aiken Elec. Coop., Inc., 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d
716, 718 (1955).
"' See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 26o (1968).
'427 F.2d at 315.
